

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

PACOM, JCS, OSD, NSS,  
Reviews Completed

*4942*  
*1st and 2nd - Action*  
ACTION

December 15, 1969

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*

SUBJECT: U. S. Operations to Lower Enemy Morale in  
Vietnam

In response to your request for information on our programs to reduce morale in North Vietnam and among the VC, I earlier gave you a report on our covert activities in this regard. The following reports on our other related programs.

1. Within South Vietnam, the following major programs are under way:

- Radio. Our Mission presently produces an extensive range of weekly programs describing GVN progress and other favorable themes. These are broadcast over the growing network of GVN radio stations and are estimated to reach about 70 per cent of the populace which is now fairly well supplied with receivers. Expansion of the network now underway will enable the GVN to reach some 95 per cent of the populace by the end of 1970.
- Printed Matter. Our Mission produces and distributes a two-page newspaper which is air-dropped in about 1.3 million copies fortnightly over contested areas. On special occasions (your speech of November 3rd), circulation is over 2 million.
- Chieu Hoi Program. This rightly falls within the area of undermining enemy morale. Although it is primarily a GVN program, there is a strong U.S. input. During the past year, for example, U.S. efforts have resulted in the expansion of the "Third Party Inducement Program" which rewards those who induce others to rally. There is evidence that this program has had a rather strong impact on enemy morale.

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- U.S. Military Programs. The U.S. armed forces conduct extensive air drop leaflet operations in connection with B-52 strikes to exploit the psychological impact of the bombings. These have been found to be among the most effective of the psywar programs. Tactical operations on the ground against the enemy are also normally supported by leaflet and loudspeaker operations.

2. Within and against North Vietnam, our psywar operations are far more limited at present, mainly because of the cessation of hostile military operations against the DRV. Prior to the end of the bombing, we air-dropped many millions of leaflets over the North and conducted occasional marine forays against the coast which were partially designed to have a psywar impact.

At present, the only overt program directed against North Vietnam is a radio service called the "Voice of Freedom" which beams many hours of broadcasts from Huế. Its power has recently been expanded, but it is still considered unreliable in reaching Hanoi audiences and the heavily populated Red River Delta during the daylight hours.

There is also an extensive air drop leaflet program in operation in the Laos Panhandle aimed at NVA troops infiltrating South Vietnam. This is intended to strike at the effectiveness of NVA troops by encouraging defections, dissatisfaction, and anxiety. There is some evidence that it has been effective, but like the other programs this is hard to prove and to measure explicitly.

Possible Improvements:

Conversations between my staff and personnel connected with the programs at USIA, DOD and CIA indicate that in South Vietnam, at least, we probably have an adequate volume of operations going in the demonstrably effective programs. Changes suggested were largely in the nature of refinements best left to the organizations themselves and to field personnel associated with the programs.

There was some fear that our increasing emphasis on Vietnamization and the consequent juggling of our assets might result in displacement and abandonment of some valuable psywar efforts. We should, of course, guard against this.

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In reference to North Vietnam, it would appear that there is definite room for improvement in our overt radio output and that there is need for considering whether we wish to renew air drop operations. This has been proposed, but has been rejected at lower policy levels of the Government because of the political implications in connection with the negotiations.

RECOMMENDATION:

I believe you should request the Secretary of Defense and the Director of USIA to give us a formal assessment of their psywar programs and any suggestions they may have for bolstering them, particularly in connection with the North Vietnamese populace. If you approve of this, I will undertake to request a study from them.

Approve



Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Other \_\_\_\_\_

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: US Operations to Lower Enemy Morale in Vietnam

In response to your request for information on our programs to reduce morale in North Vietnam and among the VC, I have had my staff check into the situation and what might be done to improve the present effort.

1. Within South Vietnam ~~I find~~ the following major programs are underway:

- Radio. Our Mission presently produces an extensive range of weekly programs describing GVN progress and other favorable themes. These are broadcast over the growing network of GVN radio stations and are estimated to reach about 70 percent of the populace which is now fairly well supplied with receivers. Expansion of the network now underway will enable the GVN to reach some 95 percent of the populace by the end of 1970.
- Printed Matter. Our Mission produces and distributes a two-page newspaper which is air dropped in about 1.3 million copies fortnightly over contested areas. On special occasions (your speech of November 3rd), circulation is over 2 million.
- Chieu Hoi Program. This rightly falls within the area of undermining enemy morale. Although it is primarily a GVN program, there is a strong US input. During the past year, for example, US efforts have resulted in the expansion of the "Third Party Inducement Program" which rewards those who induce others to rally. There is evidence that this program has had a rather strong impact on enemy morale.

*you a report on our covert activities in this regard. The following reports on other related programs.*

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-- US Military Programs. The US armed forces conduct extensive air drop leaflet operations in connection with B-52 strikes to exploit the psychological impact of the bombings. These have been found to be among the most effective of the psywar programs. Tactical operations on the ground against the enemy are also normally supported by leaflet and loudspeaker operations.

2. Within and against North Vietnam, our psywar operations are far more limited at present, mainly because of the cessation of hostile military operations against the DRV. Prior to the end of the bombing, we air dropped many millions of leaflets over the North and conducted occasional marine forays against the coast which were partially designed to have a psywar impact.

At present, the only overt program directed against North Vietnam is a radio service called the "Voice of Freedom" which beams many hours of broadcasts from Hue. Its power has recently been expanded, but it is still considered unreliable in reaching Hanoi audiences and the heavily populated Red River Delta during the daylight hours.

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There is also an extensive air drop leaflet program in operation in the Laos Panhandle aimed at NVA troops infiltrating South Vietnam. This is intended to strike at the effectiveness of NVA troops by encouraging defections, dissatisfaction, and anxiety. There is some evidence that it has been effective, but like the other programs this is hard to prove and to measure explicitly.

Possible Improvements:

Conversations between my staff and personnel connected with the programs at USIA, DOD and CIA indicate that in South Vietnam, at least, we probably have an adequate volume of operations going in the demonstrably effective programs. Changes suggested were largely in the nature of refinements best left to the organizations themselves and to field personnel associated with the programs.

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There was some fear that our increasing emphasis on Vietnamization and the consequent juggling of our assets might result in displacement and abandonment of some valuable psywar efforts. We should, of course, guard against this.

In reference to North Vietnam, it would appear that there is definite room for improvement in our overt radio output and that there is need for considering whether we wish to renew air drop operations. This has been proposed, but has been rejected at lower policy levels of the Government because of the political implications in connection with the negotiations. ~~We do know, of course, that morale in the DRV has~~ actually declined since the termination of the bombing.

RECOMMENDATION:

I believe you should request the Secretary of Defense, the Director of USIA <sup>and</sup> ~~and the Director of CIA~~ to give us a formal assessment of their psywar programs and any suggestions they may have for bolstering them, particularly in connection with the North Vietnamese populace. If you approve of this, I will undertake to request a study from them.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Other \_\_\_\_\_

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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
December 15, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE DIRECTOR, U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: Psywar Operations Against the Vietnamese  
Communists

The President has requested that you prepare an assessment of your programs designed to lower the morale of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese populace. The assessment should include suggestions for improving the programs, particularly against North Vietnam, and should also deal with any problems you foresee in the disruption of the psywar programs as Vietnamization proceeds.



Henry A. Kissinger

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MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE DIRECTOR OF U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Psywar Operations Against the Vietnamese Communists

The President has requested that you prepare an assessment of your programs designed to lower the morale of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese populace. The assessment should include suggestions for improving the programs, particularly against North Vietnam, and should also deal with any problems you foresee in the disruption of the psywar programs as Vietnamization proceeds.

Henry A. Kissinger

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HAK:JHH:DM:pmh 12/11/69



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

November 24, 1969


MEMO FOR:

John Holdridge

THRU:

Secretariat

FROM:

Al Haig 

The President has asked about our programs for reducing morale in North Vietnam and among the VC. Could you please prepare a memorandum from HAK to the President indicating what programs we have in these areas (if we have any with regard to North Vietnam), their ~~adequacy~~, and what we might do to improve them.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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Done*

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December 11, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: John H. Holdridge *JH*

SUBJECT: Psywar Operations Against the Vietnamese Communists

In response to the President's request for information about our programs designed to reduce enemy morale in North and South Vietnam, we have reviewed the existing effort with the DOD and USIA. I have prepared a draft memorandum to the President recounting the status of our effort, making some general suggestions for improvements, and suggesting that a more formal study be undertaken on the matter by the concerned Departments.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab A.

Attachment

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